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Many students of cooperative organizations have underscored that cooperatives are 
plagued by substantial incentive problems, so that members do not bear the full impact 
of their individual choices. It is argued that incentive problems are inherent in the 
cooperative form. I claim that the critique needs further clarification. The idea to be 
advanced here is that the validity of the critique raised from agency theory and property 
right theory rest with their ex ante assumptions about the nature of cooperative 
membership. The pivotal point is whether members are essentially ascribed the 
properties, reasoning and strategies of a rational investor or a rational user. 
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Incentive problems have come to the forefront in cooperative studies. Increasingly, 
students of cooperative organizations have applied property rights theory (PRT) and 
agency theory (AT) as theoretical frameworks for identifying incentive problems within 
the cooperative form (Vitaliano,1983; Porter & Scully,1987; Nilsson, 2001; Cook & 
Iliopoulos, 2000; Harte, 1997). These contributors converge on a set of interrelated 
incentive problems that are thought to plague cooperatives more fundamentally than 
other organization forms such as investor-owned firms. There are many types of 
incentive problems, and their common core is the assumption that members do not bear 
the full impacts of his/her choices and actions. As shall be explained in the following, 
some incentive problems are investment-related (common property/free rider, horizon, 
portfolio) whereas other incentive problems are decision-related (control, follow-up, 
influence-cost). Notwithstanding the fact that incentive problems are often unfolding in 
cooperative organizations, I shall here claim that the critique raised from the perspec-
tives of property right theory (PRT) and agency theory (AT) should be more concerned 
with the conditions under which incentive problems are most likely to arise. The 
description of incentive problems is the result of a set of assumptions with respect to 
members’ goal orientation and perceived self-interest. My point of departure here is that 
incentive problems emerge only under certain conditions, and the challenge is to specify 
these conditions clearly in order to assess the validity of the critique. The upshot is that 
the problem description presented by agency theory and property right theory must be 
examined in light of the properties of man and economic activity that are presupposed 
by these theories. The conclusions to be drawn from AT and PRT are the results of a 
particular way of describing the cooperative membership; i.e. the role of investor. A 
more careful consideration of the conditions under which incentive problems emerge as 
problematic is required. 
1
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 The article proceeds as follows: First, a brief overview of incentive problems in 
cooperatives is presented, as seen through the lenses of agency theory and property 
rights theory. Thereafter follows a discussion of the particular assumptions of human 
behavior that is taken for granted in these theories. These assumptions are thereafter 
critized, and some alternative assumptions are suggested. From this basis, an alternative 
look at incentive problems is suggested. 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) claims that two categories of contracts are fundamental in 
organizations: (1) Contracts that regulate the residual rights and (2) contracts by which 
decision processes are designed. The former is particularly concerned with the obli-
gations, rights and risk of the residual claimants; i.e. the duties and liabilities that follow 
from the role as investor. Within this category, three investment-related incentive 
problems are commonly assumed to be of particular relevance for the cooperative form; 
i.e. the “common property”-problem, the “horizon”-problem and the “portfolio”-
problem. Here, these incentive problems shall be briefly presented, predominantly from 
the perspective of property right theory. Particular focus is on the reasons why these 
problems are assumed to be more problematic in cooperative organizations than in IOFs 
(investor-owned firms) or other competing forms. The latter category (decision-related 
incentive problems) relates to the contracts by which decision processes are designed. 
Four interrelated incentive problems—the monitoring problem, the follow-up problem, 
the influence cost problem and the decision problem—shall here be briefly presented, 
predominantly from the perspective of agency theory. Here too, particular emphasis is 
on the reasons why these problems are perceived of as more problematic in cooperatives 
than in IOFs.  
Investment-related incentive problems are predominantly conceptualized from the 
perspective of property right theory. Property rights provide owners with a claim to the 
residual returns of the firm and assign them a more or less influential role in the 
decision process. Three property rights are commonly distinguished; the right to use an 
asset (“usus”), the right to reap the benefits generated by use of the asset (“usus 
fructus”), and the right to transfer part or all of these rights to others (“abusus”) 
(Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). Three types of investment-related incentive problems 
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dominate in the literature; the common property problem, the horizon problem and the 
portfolio-problem. Each shall be briefly presented below. 
The common property problem is concerned with the disparity between the 
members’ contribution to the financing of investments and the distribution of benefits 
that results from members’ investments. The disparity between a members’ contribution 
of equity and his/her benefit from the equity is assumed to lead to free rider behavior 
between members and non-members, and between existing and newly entering 
members. In other words, the free rider problem is intimately linked to the fact that the 
equity is collectively owned (common property). Further, the distinct nature of this 
“common property problem” refers to the lack of a system for valuing and trading 
residual rights (the right to acquire the cooperative net surplus). As observed by 
Vitaliano (op.cit,. p.1082):
“Upon admission to membership in a cooperative organization, a new member-
patron acquires the same rights to the organization’s residual cash flows based on 
patronage and the same rights to participate in the organizational decision process 
as those held by existing members. New members are rarely required initially to 
pay fees or make investments approximately equal in amount to the value of these 
rights.”
Vitaliano calls attention to the adversarial consequences of this common property 
problem. He holds that the common property aspects of the residual claims of a 
cooperative give rise to differences in the preferences of various subgroups of its 
members, based upon the length of time their claims have been held. The cause of the 
problem is that the individual cooperative member has no direct or personal control over 
“his” respective part of the unallocated capital. The capital is in everybodies’ hands, but 
not in anyones’ hands. So why should cooperative members engage in issues (s)he can 
not impact? The pessimistic assumption is that common ownership fosters apathy 
among members (Nilsson, 2001). The adversarial consequences of common property 
are expected to be read off both in the form of inefficieny and weak membership 
commitment.  
A second incentive problem is the so-called horizon problem. Following property 
right theory, the horizon problem stems from the fact that residual claims of 
cooperatives are contingent rights to cash flows whose validity expires when a member 
ceases to patronize the organization. As argued by Vitaliano (op.cit, p.1082):  
“Residual claimants can capture the benefits of investment decisions only over 
the time horizons of their expected membership in the organization. This can be 
expected to give rise to additional differences in subgroup preferences among 
members, based on differences in such horizons, with a general tendency for them 
to favor investment decisions with short payoff horizon. Horizon problems of 
cooperative residual claims therefore have implications for cooperative invest-
ment behavior and organizational growth...”  
Consequently, members are expected to become preoccupied with myopic perspectives 
on their cooperative membership. “Here-and-now” actions are assumed to dominate a 
long-term, strategic perspective on the purpose of the cooperative. A system of tradable 
owner shares is expected to solve the horizon problem since members with short payoff 
horizon could sell their ownership shares to members with a longer payoff horizon. 
The portfolio problem refers to the situation that members have diverse risk/reward-
profiles. As long as cooperative members have unequal time horizons there will be 
different viewpoints with respect to their cooperative’s risk/reward-profile. From the 
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perspective of agency theory, cooperatives should ideally have an investment portfolio 
that reflects the members’ preferred trade-off between risk and reward. Vitaliano 
(op.cit) holds that the root cause of the portfolio problem is that the restriction of 
residual claims to the patron group in cooperatives deprive members of the opportunity 
to diversify their risk by holding the claims of many organizations, either directly or 
through mutual stock funds etc. Such portfolio problems can give rise to further differ-
ences in preferences among subgroups of members, with a general tendency for them to 
favor decisions with lower levels of risk. Here too, the portfolio problem is assumed to 
be particularly problematic in cooperatives due to the lack of a trading system of 
residual rights. Such a system would have allowed members to develop an investment 
portfolio that corresponds to their preferred risk/reward-profile.
Another group of incentive problems are related more directly to the decision 
mechanisms in cooperatives. Since these decision-related incentive problems are drawn 
and derived from agency theory, a brief presentation of agency theory is necessary. 
Modern agency theory has many ancestors. Its roots may be found in the works of Ross 
(1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), Holmstrøm and Tirole 
(1988), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1986), Furubotn & Pejovich, 
(1974) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). These contributions originate from different 
perspectives such as the theory of the firm, theories of incomplete contracts and infor-
mation economics. Agency theory address problems within organizations where owner-
ship and leadership are separated (Eisenhardt, 1989). More specifically, a principal-
agent relationship arises when a principal contracts with an agent to perform some tasks 
on behalf of the principal. The principal delegates authority to the agent, and the welfare 
of the principal is affected by the choices of the agent. Agency relations can be found 
both between firms (for instance franchising and licensing) and within firms (manager 
vs. subordinate, employer vs. employee, cooperative members vs. the management of a 
cooperative firm). Agency theory is particularly concerned with those situations in 
which the agency relation is problematic. Organizations are viewed in terms of conflicts 
of interests between principals and agents. Relations between principals and agents tend 
to be complex because no contract is perfect, and contracts are costly to draft, maintain 
and follow up. Barney and Hesterly (1996) conclude that the delegation of decision-
making authority from principal to agent is particularly problematic under three 
conditions: when the interests of principal and agent diverge, when the principal cannot 
perfectly and costless monitor the actions of the agent, and when the principal cannot 
perfectly and costless monitor and acquire the information that is available to or 
possessed by the agent. Control costs occur because the principal must use resources to 
direct and control the agent. This is done by establishing a contract and by controlling 
and ensuring the fulfillment of the contract. However, since the agent has the freedom to 
make independent decisions, there is some risk that he will not manage the organization 
in a fashion that best benefits the principal. The principal has rights to the surplus 
created by the organisations activities (residual rights), but the agent is able to direct the 
organization so that the surplus of the organization is influenced. Two generic problems 
can occur as a consequence of potentially differing interests: moral hazard (hidden 
actions), and adverse selection (hidden information) (Arrow, 1985). Moral hazard 
involves situations in which the actions of the agents are either hidden from the 
principal or costly to observe. This makes it either impossible or costly for the principal 
Rethinking incentive problems in cooperative organizations 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2003
8
to fully monitor the actions of the agents. For instance, owners may find it prohibitively 
costly to fully monitor the behavior of their top management team. The employment 
relation is one in which effort and ability are typically difficult to observe. The 
employee (agent) possesses information that is unobservable or costly to obtain by the 
employer (principal). Consequently, the employer cannot fully ascertain whether or not 
his interests are best served by the decisions of the employee. Guidelines may be spelled 
out and the agent may to some extent be monitored, but the agency relationship is 
nevertheless characterized by the freedom to independently determine activities and 
contracts.
The overriding theme in agency theory is how to harmonize the conflicting interests 
of principals and agents. What is the optimal level of control that principals must effect 
to be assured that agents act in their true interests? According to agency theory, the 
strategy to counteract agency problems is to establish a system of efficient financial 
rewards that specify how the principal can align the agent’s interests with his own 
interests, and to clarify how the principal can direct and control the agent. Agency 
theorists are particularly focused on inefficiency of the decision-making process, poor 
business strategy implementation and high influence costs. More specifically, a number 
of intimately related decision problems are commonly found in cooperative organi-
zations, such as the monitoring problem, the follow-up problem, the influence cost 
problem and the decision problem (van Bekkum, 2001). 
The monitoring problem stems from the fact that decision management is allocated 
to decision specialists who are not residual claimants. There is therefore a risk that 
agents will make decisions in such a way as to lower the value of the firm’s residual 
claims, which gives rise to agency costs. Monitoring devices available to the traditional 
cooperative may be inadequate to gather sufficient information in situations where the 
cooperative engages in highly complex operations.  
The follow-up problem is expected to occur if there are many members, each unable 
to significantly influence decision-making processes or supervision of the management, 
and individually capturing only a small fraction of potential benefits from such activi-
ties.
The influence cost problem occur when there are different group of owners of the 
cooperative with opposing interests, each entitled to share in the distribution of benefits 
and engaging in internal lobby activities to promote their own selfish interests.  
Finally, the decision problem relates to the situation of a large and heterogeneous 
membership, making it challenging for the management to decide how to weigh 
different member opinions. 
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I have now presented a short review of the nature and causes of incentive problems in 
cooperatives, as seen through the lenses of property right theory and agency theory. A 
fundamental question is when—i.e. under what conditions—these incentive problems 
are most likely to unfold. As already indicated, there are some suggestions available in 
the scholarly literature. Nilsson (2001) has emphasized that incentive problems can 
appear as more or less problematic in cooperatives depending on such variables as the 
degree of homogenity of the membership body, the amount of financial contribution
from members, the degree of contingency between members goals and cooperative 
goals, as well as the degree of members’ involvement with their cooperative. 
Cook and Iliopoulos (1998) have suggested a number of criteria that partially overlap 
with Nilsson (op.cit). Their first criteria is singleness of purpose, since homogeneity of 
economic interests eliminates free rider, influence and portfolio negative externalities. 
The second criteria is control of supply, since the ability of cooperatives to control 
quantity and quality variability in premium produced output creates organizational 
boundaries which allows for the development of a more clearly defined set of incentives 
for risk capital investment. The third criteria is incentives for Risk Capital Investment,
since these will create incentives for users to contribute to growth-oriented risk capital 
acquisition and reduce the organisational inefficiencies generated by the horizon and 
portfolio problems. Fourth, incentive problems may be ameliorated through creating a 
sense of belongings to the cooperative. Finally, the design of contractual arrangements 
defining responsibility of obligation may reduce quantity variability, quality variability, 
and pool earning dilution along with free rider issues. (p. 551). 
In the following, my focus is also on conditions under which incentive problems are 
most likely to emerge and develop in cooperative organizations. The idea I advance, 
however, is that the validity of the critique from agency theory and property right theory 
rest also with their ex ante assumptions about the nature of cooperative membership. 
The pivotal point is whether members are essentially ascribed the reasoning and 
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strategies of a rational investor or a rational user. In its simplest form, this message is 
presented in Figure 3.1 below. 
(I) 
Match 
(II) Mis-
match
(III) Mis-
match
(IV)  
Match
Coop IOF 
user 
investor
Membership 
strategy 
Ownership structure
Figure 3.1 Match/mismatch between ownership structure and membership strategy 
The underlying question—well-known from the scholarly strategy literature—is 
whether or not there is a reasonable match between an organizations structure and its 
strategy. The special case here is that mismatches may occur between the ownership 
structure that patrons choose and their overall strategic intent. Meritoriously, agency 
theory and property rights underline that the quadrant III in Figure 3.1 is problematic, 
which is read off in the form of incentive problems. However, the analysis from these 
two perspectives seem to presuppose that members think and act like investors rather 
than users. This underlying premise is contestable. Members in cooperatives are—de 
facto—users rather than investors. This fact should imprint the exploration of incentive 
problems more than have so far been the case. My contribution here is to try and rethink 
the incentive problems, given that members are ascribed a “user logic” rather than an 
“investor logic”. 
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To what extent incentive problems plague cooperative organizations depend—inter 
alia—on the assumptions made about the nature of cooperative membership. For 
instance, the role as user of an agriculture cooperative refers to the fact that members 
enter the cooperative in order to achieve a secure market outlet for their products. Their 
goal function is normally multidimensional, but the overall objective qua user is to 
secure market access over time, at best possible product prices. In accordance with the 
argument from Transaction Cost Economics, the underlying motivation for a member 
(qua user) to enter a mutually binding agreement with a cooperative is to reduce 
uncertainty related to market access, and thereby protect specific investments. This is 
different from the perspective of a capital investor. The objective of the latter is to 
maximize return on invested capital, given his risk-reward profile. His capital is mobile, 
and should in principle be moved between different investment options according to 
relative changes in their respective profitability score. In principle, the strategic 
rationale of a user deviates from an investor, e.g. when it comes to phenomena such as 
perceived self-interest and derived concepts like risk-taking and mutual obligations over 
time. 
I assume that incentive problems are essentially the result of a mismatch between the 
ownership structure (here: cooperative) and strategic intent (here: a clearcut investor 
strategy). In the real world, the roles are commonly intertwined, but in order to clarify 
the argument, I shall here separate them and give them an idealtypical content. The 
further point I want to make is that—if the strategy of a member is more in tune with 
the role as user, it is less likely that incentive problems unfold in cooperatives. Agency 
theory and property rights theory ascribe the members a too simple version of self-
interest; i.e. a replication of the well-known “Economic Man”-image which is pre-
dominantly occupied with isolated individuals. This conceptualization may suffice if the 
task at hand is to model the very essence of investment behavior. But it is incomplete if 
the task is to capture the strategic reasoning and acts of a cooperative user. This debate 
is too wide to raise in any detail here, and I shall confine myself to briefly mention a 
few other conceptions of self-interest that may show useful in order to better understand 
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the rationale of a user. Etzioni’s “I and We” paradigm (Etzioni, 1988) highlights that 
individuals act within a social context, that this context is not reducible to individual 
acts, and, most significantly, that the social context is not necessarily or wholly 
imposed. Instead, the social context is to a significant extent perceived as a legitimate 
and integral part of one’s existence, a “We”, a whole of which the individuals are 
constituent elements. The “I and We” paradigm assumes that people have at least some 
significant involvement in the community, a sense of shared identity, and commitment 
to values; a sense that “we are members of one another”. Hence, adhering to shared 
values is often a matter not of expedient conformity, but of internalization of moral 
values, at least in part (Wrong, 1961, p. 186). This extended image of self-interest 
stands in a striking contrast to the assumptions of man made by agency theory and 
property right theory that either do not recognize collectivities at all, or sees them 
simply as aggregates of individuals without causal properties of their own and as 
external to the person. The individual is seen as being detached from the community 
and from shared values, calculating whether or not to be a member and whether or not 
to heed the value dictates. So-called stewardship theory (Davies, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997) has much in common with Etzionis reasoning. The ex ante 
assumptions of a steward is that (s)he is motivated by higher order needs of growth, 
achievement, and self-actualization, and by intrinsic rewards. Pro-organizational, 
collectivistic behavior has a higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behavior. 
(S)he accepts responsibility and accountability for the organizational community. An 
earlier suggestion in the same spirit is the “club theory”, as suggested by Buchanan 
(1965). In the following I shall try and exemplify these arguments more. My discussion 
is structured around the typology of incentive problems that was presented earlier. 
Agency theory and property rights theory are predominantly concerned with the 
disadvantages that collective residual rights represent for cooperative members. But 
given that members think and act strategically qua their role as user, members should be 
ascribed the capability to conduct a more balanced assessment so that both advantages 
and disadvantages are taken into account. First, risk adverse members may appreciate 
that collectively owned equity capital serves as an alleviation and absorber of external 
shocks; i.e. unexpected and potentially damaging contingencies that cannot easily be 
dealt with by members individually and separately. Common responsibility may be 
especially important in a situation where members’ collective interests are threatened. 
The “insurance function” that is related to collectively owned equity may reduce 
exogenous uncertainty for members and ameliorate their need for individual insurance 
arrangements. Collectively owned—and therefore stable—equity may also set 
cooperatives in a good negotiation position vis-a-vis providers of loan capital (bank and 
other financial institutions). Furthermore, the free rider-problem—that a new member 
come too easy to benefits developed by other members—is more complex than assumed 
by AT and PRT. A rational user should weigh the disadvantages related to no 
compensation when exiting the cooperative against the advantages of free entrance 
(costless entry). Over time, the individual member will probably shift from being an 
“underperformer” to being an “overperformer”. From the perspectives of rational user 
(i.e. enhanced self-interest” and generalized reciprocity), this can be a normal and 
acceptable situation. The more fundamental underlying condition is whether or not 
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members’ advantages qua user is made explicit and embedded in a cooperative ideology 
that envision members’ rights and duties over time. For instance, such an cooperative 
ideology may maintain that collectively owned equity manifests a collective protection-
shield around members’ financial investments and associated immaterial values (brand 
name etc.). The ideology may further maintain that these collective investments have a 
wider scope than values provided by investor-owned companies. 
The objective of a rational investor is to maximize his portfolio of financial invest-
ments, in accordance with his risk/reward-preferences. AT and PRT pose the appropri-
ate critique that the cooperative form is not the adequate structure for people that pursue 
the logic of a rational investor. It is, however, too far to claim that the horizon problem 
reflects an in-built disadvantage of the cooperative form. A user may conduct a more 
balanced assessment of advantages and disadvantages of the cooperative membership. If 
a user plans to cease to patronage the cooperative in three years from now, will he 
necessarily vote down all collective investments with a longer time horizon than three 
years? It may be the case, but not with any necessity. As a rational user, (s)he may be 
aware that (s)he earlier—as a newcomer—has benefited from the “overinvestments” 
made by preceding members who are no longer active members. The “role” as 
underachiever and “overachiever” change over time, which is a normal situation in a 
cooperative, in tune with the principle of generalized reciprocity. Whether the net total 
over time is perceived of as negative or positive is essentially an empirical question. A 
parallel decision criteria is that the disadvantages associated with no compensation 
when exiting, must be weighed against the advantage associated with free entry. 
Moreover, the user may weigh potential disadvantages of “overperforming” etc. in a 
certain period against the increased transactions costs associated with establishing an 
alternative market outlet. What are the alternative costs in terms of search costs, 
information costs and control costs associated with establishing an alternative to the 
cooperative membership? The factual significance of such heuristic decision rules may 
of course vary, but they should not be ruled out at the outset as have up till now been 
done by agency theory and property rights theory. 
AT and PRT address the problems and disadvantages associated with different risk-
reward-profiles. As discussed above, however, the fundamental issue is whether 
members conceive of their membership as a capital-investment at all. Is cooperative 
membership essentially about (1) optimizing patronage and secure market access or (2) 
optimizing financial investments as judged by the individual’s risk/reward preference? 
Indeed, users also invest in their cooperative firm. But the underlying rationale differs 
from that of an investor. Members’ investments in the form of retained earnings are 
predominantly made to increase the cooperatives capability to serve as an efficient 
market outlet. Retained earnings in year 1 is therefore expected to be renumerated by 
satisfactory product prices in year 2. The specific outcome of this type of calculation 
may of course vary, but this type of decision structure is more adapted to the features of 
the cooperative form. To patronize a cooperative is essentially a strategy to set up an 
effective system for market access, which is—at the end of the day—a vehicle for 
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optimizing product prices. Normally, membership of a cooperative is motivated by that 
feature, whereas IOF’s are expected to be more attractive than cooperatives when it 
comes to return of capital investments. 
From the perspectives of agency theory and property rights theory, much has been said 
about various decision problems in cooperatives. It is clear that the degree of 
homogeneity is a vital factor to explain high levels of transaction costs associated with 
decision problems. But again, there are advantages of the cooperative form that should 
be explored further. For instance, the cooperative board and management are expected 
to be highly sensitive to members’ interests—qua users (Hansman, 1990). Decisions 
processes in cooperatives may be slow, but they tend to be transparent and invite to 
active participation. Subsequently, they may be followed by substantial discipline when 
it comes to implementation. A member is more loyal to decisions to which he has 
participated actively than to decisions that are imposed on him. 
Furthermore, a rational user is presumably able to compare the costs and benefits of 
collective decision-making within the cooperative with the costs and benefits of 
alternative modes, such as conducting market transactions on his own risk and fortune. 
Probably, members (read: users) that obviously benefit from the cooperative in terms of 
reduced transaction costs (one overall market outlet) are inclined to tolerate some level 
of corporate control costs. Again, the specific outcome of this type of balanced 
reasoning is an empirical question. 
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My theme is whether or not agency theory and property rights theory offer a reasonable 
image of incentive problems in cooperative organizations. I am skeptical. I think that 
the assumptions underlying agency theory and property rights theory first and foremost 
capture the rationale of an investor, to the neglect of the role that should be more more 
familiar role of user, in cooperative organizations. However, the contributions based on 
agency theory and property rights theory make a useful description of a mis-match 
problem: That a specific choice of ownership structure (read: cooperative) do not match 
a specific strategic intent (read: investor). This is an elementary insights, but seems not 
to have been taken sufficiently into account when cooperative organizations are 
explored from the perspective of agency theory and property rights theory. One reason 
may be that what we find in practice are various blends of the two roles. An illustrative 
example is found in new-generation cooperatives, characterized by active users and 
active investors. It is consistent with my reasoning above that this type of hybrid 
organizations (“partly coops and partly IOFs”) now lay so much effort on developing a 
matching governance structure; partially following the logic of member as user, and 
partially following the logic of member as investor. Future research on incentive 
problems from the perspective of agency theory and property rights theory should take 
this development into account. 
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